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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the welfare benefits from falling relative prices of IT (information 
technology) goods across a wide range of countries.  We find, using two separate 
methodologies and datasets, that welfare benefits mainly accrue to users of IT, not their 
producers, because of falling relative prices.  This is important, as IT production and use are 
highly differentiated across countries, and implies that earlier work on how IT production 
affects real GDP, while useful in calibrating the overall benefits of the IT revolution, are a 
less valuable way of assessing the distribution of benefits. 
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1.   Introduction 
The “new economy” (by which we mean the information technology (IT) sector) has gone 
through some notable ups and downs over a short period, from unbridled optimism through 
much of 2000 to skepticism after the crash in IT equity prices later that year.1  Academic 
work on this subject has gone through a similar cycle, with a series of relatively optimistic 
estimates of its impact on productivity being produced, followed by a pause in such work. 
This paper (which was started during the optimistic phase of IT analysis) looks 
beyond the extensive literature that focuses on the impact of IT on output and productivity2 to 
examine a different issue — where are the welfare benefits of the expansion of the IT sector 
located?  Or, as Cicero put it many years ago, cui bono (who profits)?  This is important, as 
IT production and sales are highly differentiated across countries, with production (as a share 
of output) concentrated in a small number of countries, most notably in emerging market 
countries of Asia, and sales largest in many of the richer countries, such as the United States.  
We come to the stark and important conclusion that owing to rapidly falling relative prices, 
the welfare benefits accrue mainly to consumers of IT goods, not their producers.  In short, 
the impact on real GDP is a highly misleading measure of the distribution of the benefits of 
IT. 
We should emphasize that this paper looks at the direct impact of falling IT prices on 
welfare, not at the benefit gains made in the rest of the economy owing to a reorganization of 
production.  The welfare benefits of any general-purpose technology (such as IT, electricity, 
the railways, or steam power) come through two channels.3  Initially, the main benefits are 
associated with the fall in relative prices of existing products and the creation of new 
products — this is the issue we investigate.  Over the longer run, total factor productivity 
rises economy-wide owing to a reorganization of production based on use of these goods by 
other producers.  Views differ on the evidence for a generalized increase in productivity 
associated with the use of IT equipment in the United States, the country in which IT use is 
the most advanced so far, and its impact is likely to be even smaller for other countries, 
                                                 
1 A pattern also typical of earlier “all-purpose” technology revolutions, see IMF (2001). 
2 Key early references are Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Gordon (2000). 
3 See Crafts (2000). 
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justifying the focus in this paper.4  More generally, these spillovers are, in any case, 
associated with the use of IT goods by other industries, underlining our central point that the 
main benefits of the IT revolution are accruing to countries that buy IT goods, rather than 
those that produce them. 
We illustrate our basic point through two analytic exercises that use separate 
methodologies and datasets: 
The first exercise takes a comprehensive look at the impact of falling IT prices on real 
GDP and real domestic demand across a wide range of countries using a consistent dataset.  
The benefits to real GDP are highly skewed to a small number of countries with large IT 
sectors relative to output.  However, because these countries export most of their production, 
they face a constant deterioration of their terms of trade as the relative prices of IT goods fall.  
As a result, the benefits to domestic demand are largest for major consuming countries, most 
notably the United States. 
The second exercise measures welfare directly by calculating “social savings,” a 
variant of consumer surplus used in earlier work on technological revolutions — again across 
a wide range of countries using a consistent dataset.  The results again indicate that the 
benefits accrue to the main users of IT goods, not producers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides some 
background by summarizing how statistical agencies have responded to the rapid changes in 
relative prices caused by the IT revolution as well as existing work on the impact of IT on 
output and productivity.  Section 3 provides some illustrative estimates of the impact of 
falling IT prices on real GDP and real domestic demand, emphasizing the very different 
responses in individual cases.  The following section estimates IT-related welfare gains by 
calculating social saving across a wide range of countries, while Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The United States is the country most analyzed in this regard, largely because IT use is the 
most advanced there.  See Bailey (2001) and Stiroh (2001) for a discussion of recent studies 
using different empirical approaches. 
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2.   Current Estimates of the Impact of IT on the Economy 
 
Existing work on the contribution of IT to the economy falls into two broad categories:  the 
improvement of the underlying national income statistics to take account of rapid changes in 
relative prices, and estimates of the contributions to real output growth from capital (with the 
IT capital stock differentiated from the non-IT capital stock), labor, and total factor 
productivity (again differentiating between the IT sector and the rest of the economy).  Most 
of the initial work in both areas focused on the United States. 
 
2.1.   Accounting for rapid changes of relative prices of IT goods  
 
In response to rapid changes in relative prices associated with the IT revolution, the US 
national income and product accounts (NIPA) — increasingly followed by other official 
agencies — have introduced two major modifications, both of which are important for some 
of the calculations we perform below. 5  The first involves estimating the fall in prices caused 
by technologically inspired improvements in IT goods.  The difficulty is that most IT goods 
(such as computers) incorporate a wide range of different capabilities (RAM, memory, 
drives, etc.), which may have increased at different rates, and that some of these capabilities 
have been newly introduced as technology has improved.  To take account of this, changes in 
the prices of computers and related IT goods are measured through “hedonic” price indices, 
in which econometric estimates of prices across a range of goods with differing capabilities 
are used to get an estimate of the value of each component.  Estimated values of individual 
characteristics are then combined to get an estimated price of a typical computer.  As shown 
in Table 1 for the United States, these hedonic price indices show quite dramatic falls in the 
relative prices of many IT goods, here defined as the prices of IT goods relative to the GDP 
deflator. 
The second adjustment regards the weighting of the increases in real output/demand 
across different sectors/types of goods.  Traditionally, the aggregate increase in real activity 
in the national accounts is calculated by means of a Laspeyres index, which means that 
relative prices for a specific base year are used as weights.  For example, 
                                                 
5 For a more in depth discussion of these issues, see Whelan (2000). 
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where tQg ,  is the growth rate of aggregate Q at time t, 0,iP  is the price of good i in the base 
period, and tiQ ,  is the quantity of good i in period t.  This procedure works well when there 
are relatively small changes in relative prices, as the distortions caused by switching from one 
base year to another are quite limited and it makes comparisons across years relatively 
simple.  However, such a procedure is much less well suited for a situation in which relative 
prices are changing rapidly.6 
To avoid excessive reliance on prices in a single base year, the United States national 
income and product accounts (and those of several other countries, including France) have 
switched to chain weighting.  The weights applied are updated every year, and the increase in 
real activity in for any sector is measured using the geometric average of a Laspeyres index 
(in which historic prices are used as weights, see Eq. (1)) and a Paasche index (in which 
current prices are used to weight the components of demand), a calculation called a Fischer 
“ideal” index. 7  
Thus, the increase in real activity between any year and the previous one is measured 
by: 
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Chain weighting is an obvious approach to take over a period of rapid relative price 
changes as it makes the growth in real activity in the national income accounts independent 
of the base year chosen for measuring the size of the aggregate economy.  However, it also 
makes comparisons of behavior across sectors across several years more complicated.  In 
                                                 
6 For example, if the relative price of a typical computer falls by around two-thirds between 
1995 and 2000 (as it has been estimated to have done in the United States), then if 1995 
prices continue to be used to value computers there will be a large increase in output of the 
consumer industry and investment in IT goods.  When the accounts are switched to 2000 
prices, however, this effect will be reduced by two-thirds, because the Laspeyres approach 
fails to take account of the fact that as a good becomes cheaper it is used less efficiently. 
7 Whelan (2000). 
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particular, real dollar increases in the components of output/expenditure over several years no 
longer sum to the increase of the relevant aggregate value. 
 
2.2.   Estimating the contribution of the IT sector to economic growth 
 
The existing literature on the macroeconomic impact of the IT revolution focuses almost 
exclusively on the impact on real GDP and/or productivity.  The typical approach is to look at 
the relative contribution of IT and non-IT capital, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP) to 
real output growth starts from a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to 
scale, with IT and non-IT capital differentiated:8 
 y - l = ak (bITkIT + bnon-ITknon-IT) + tfp,  
where y, l, kIT, knon-IT, and tfp are the logarithms of real output, labor, the real IT capital stock, 
the real non-IT capital stock, and total factor productivity, respectively, ak stands for the share 
of profits the total economy, bIT is the nominal share of IT capital in the overall capital stock, 
and bnon-IT is the share of non-IT capital in the overall capital stock. 
Using this approach, various authors have estimated the contribution to overall growth 
made by IT investment, as well as evidence for increments to TFP growth created by IT.  
This is useful as it summarizes the size of the potential benefits from the IT revolution, but 
distracts from the issue addressed in this paper, namely who ultimately benefits.  The results 
from the US literature indicate that IT-related capital deepening provides a significant 
component of the recent increase in activity (Table 2).  As the nominal share of IT investment 
in GDP stayed largely constant, this primarily reflects changes in the quality of IT 
investment, as measured by using hedonic price indices.  There has also been an increase in 
total factor productivity, although assigning this between the IT sector itself, IT spillovers, 
and other factors such as the cycle or more efficient markets has been difficult.9 Using the 
decline in prices of IT-related goods as a measure for productivity gains in the IT sector, the 
                                                 
8 See Bailey (2001) for a wide-ranging survey on the United States, as well as Oliner and 
Sichel (2000), Gordon (2000, 2001), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), and Stiroh (2001).  For 
other countries, see Cardarelli (2001) on Australia; Economic Planning Agency (2000) on 
Japan; Estevao and Levy (2000) and Mairesse, Cette, and Kocoglu (2000) on France, Oulton 
(2001) and Kodres (2001) for the United Kingdom, and Lee and Khatri (2001) for east Asia. 
9 Stiroh (2001), analyzing the acceleration in labor productivity across US industries, finds 
that the acceleration of productivity is connected with IT intensity, but is unable to identify 
whether this reflects higher TFP growth or capital deepening. 
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studies referred to in Table 2 estimate that ¼ percent or so of the acceleration in US total 
factor productivity comes from within the IT sector. 
 
 
3.   The Impact of the IT Sector on Real GDP and Domestic Demand 
 
Given that the location of production of IT goods and their final purchase are quite distinct 
across countries, it is important to ask whether the benefits of productivity gains in the IT 
sector go to those who produce and are major exporters of IT goods (such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Ireland) or those who are major importers and users of IT goods (such as 
Australia).  We provide an answer to this issue in this section by first calculating the potential 
impact of technological progress in the production of IT goods on real output growth across a 
wide range of countries, using a common methodology and data set on IT output.10  These 
results are then contrasted with a calculation of the benefits to real domestic demand based on 
the same basic methodology but using common data on purchases of IT goods.  The impact 
of falling IT prices on real domestic demand is a better measure of welfare than real output, 
as consumption is the ultimate objective of economic activity.  As the major producers of IT 
goods export most of their IT output, we find that the welfare gains associated with 
productivity gains in the IT sector dissipate.  Indeed, gains to real GDP are insignificantly 
related to gains to domestic demand, although a weak positive relationship is found when 
relative incomes are taken into account. 
 
3.1.   Data issues 
 
Sufficiently detailed data on IT production or expenditure from national accounts are not 
available for a large number of countries, and the classification of products and methods used 
for estimating the prices of IT goods may differ across countries.  The analysis in this section 
is therefore based on private sector estimates of sales of and expenditure on various 
                                                 
10 Cross-country studies of the impact of IT on output include Colecchia (2001), Daveri 
(2001), Roeger (2001), Schreyer (2000), Lee and Pilat (2001) and Van Ark (2001).  Our 
results covers a wider range of countries and focus on real output and real domestic demand, 
using a simpler methodology that focuses on actual production rather than inputs of factors of 
production. 
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components of IT goods from Reed’s Yearbook of World Electronics Data.11  As is common 
in the literature, the price indices for the respective IT goods are based on hedonic prices 
from the US national income and product accounts and from the US producer price indices, 
adjusted for changes in the exchange rate.  The impact of the IT sector on GDP and domestic 
demand is then estimated using a chain-aggregated quantity index. 
The Reed Electronics Research database provides annual data on the production and 
on purchases of IT-related goods from 32 countries, starting in 1985.12 We focus on three 
broad aggregates, for which hedonic prices indices from the US official statistics could be 
lined up with the Reed data:  electronic data processing (EDP) equipment; communications 
equipment (Reed’s telecommunications category — covering switching equipment, 
transmission equipment, telephone sets, facsimile machines, and some other goods — as well 
as parts of the “communications and radar” category — e.g. mobile phones, other radio 
communication, cable and CCTV, and other public broadcasting); and semi-conductors (Reed 
category active components).  However, in some cases the Reed data on EDP expenditure 
were found to be problematic, with implausibly high domestic sales for some of the main 
exporters of these goods (e.g. 8 percent of GDP for Singapore, followed by 2.4 percent for 
Ireland, and 2.2 percent for Malaysia).  This may reflect double counting of intermediate 
EDP goods, or misclassification of exports as domestic sales.  The data on EDP expenditure 
have therefore been adjusted, using total expenditure on EDP goods from the Reed database 
(so that the numbers are consistent with the data on EDP production), but expenditure 
weights for IT hardware from the WITSA database, which seems less affected by 
misclassification of sales.13 
To obtain the aggregate value of IT production and expenditure, it is necessary to take 
into account that most active components are used as intermediates in computers or 
communications equipment.  In the absence of more detailed data on the use of active 
components, total expenditure on IT goods is defined as the sum of expenditure on EDP 
goods and communication equipment.  Total production of IT goods is defined as the sum of 
                                                 
11 See Reed Electronics Research, (2001). 
12 See Table 3 for a list of countries covered. 
13 The WITSA database is described in more detail in Section 4, below, where it is used for 
estimating social savings associated with the use of IT goods.  While the Digital Planet 
database comprises a larger number of countries and, unlike World Electronics Data, covers 
software, it provides data on sales only (and not on production), covers a shorter period, and 
is less disaggregated. 
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the production of EDP goods and communication equipment, plus net exports (production 
minus expenditure) of active components.  Thus, while our data may still over- or understate 
the total value of IT production in a country if there is significant net trade in intermediates 
(excluding active components), we do account for those intermediates for which 
technological progress has been most pronounced. 
National IT price indices are calculated by adjusting the US hedonic price indices for 
changes in the exchange rate.  This is a good approximation to the extent that IT goods are 
tradable and markups stay constant over time; it is used by several official statistical agencies 
(e.g. Denmark and Australia) as well as other researchers.14  While the implied view that 
there is full pass-through of exchange rate changes could be questioned, Table A3 in the 
appendix suggests that most of the variation of IT prices is associated with productivity gains 
rather than changes in the exchange rate.  In addition, it does seem to hold fairly well in at 
least one case where separate hedonic prices indices have been calculated by national 
authorities (France, see Deutsche Bank, 2001). 
 
3.2.   Estimating the impact of IT price falls on real GDP and domestic demand 
 
The impact of falling IT prices on real GDP and domestic demand is calculated by comparing 
the path of activity assuming that IT goods were priced at the GDP/domestic demand deflator 
with the path of output using hedonic price indices, chain weighting, and data on IT output 
and sales.  Hence, the thought experiment is:  what happens if an average good with no 
relative price movement is replaced by IT goods with their rapidly falling relative prices?  
For example, for real absorption, the growth rate using chain weighting from one year to 
another is calculated as: 
 1
1
1,
1
,
,
1,
1
1,
1,
,
1
,
, -
×
×
=
å
å
å
å
=
-
=
-
=
-
-
=
n
i
ti
n
i
ti
ti
ti
n
i
ti
ti
ti
n
i
ti
tABS
E
E
P
P
E
P
P
E
g , (3) 
                                                 
14 An alternative that is sometimes used is a “harmonized index,” whereby the change in 
relative prices of IT goods for a respective country is set equal to the change in relative prices 
for the United States.  See, for example, Schreyer (2000). 
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where Pi,t stands for the price of good i (either IT or non-IT), and Ei,t stands for expenditure 
on the respective good.15  For countries that use hedonic price indices the GDP and 
absorption deflators were adjusted to take this into account.   
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimates of the impact of the IT sector on the growth rates of 
real GDP and real domestic demand over the years 1996–2000.16  As a measure for 
technological progress in the IT sector, Table 3 also reports the average annual change in the 
prices of IT goods (calculated on an annual basis, using a chain-weighted index) relative to 
the GDP deflator, over the years 1996–2000.  These differ significantly across countries 
differences in the composition of IT production and changes in exchange rates.18 In 
particular, the change in relative prices of communications equipment is much smaller than 
for EDP equipment and active components.  Thus, for a country like Finland, which produces 
mainly communications equipment, and is a significant net importer of active components, 
the change in relative prices of IT goods is relatively small.  Fluctuations in exchange rates 
have some impact, especially for producers of telecommunications equipment, where world 
market prices have not declined as quickly as for EDP equipment and active components, and 
help to explain why for countries like Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, the change in relative 
prices of IT goods is positive. 
The IT sector has expanded rapidly throughout the sample, as evidenced by IT sector 
growth rates for 1996–2000 in the region of 30 to 55 percent for nine countries.  The final 
column in Table 3 estimates of the contribution of productivity gains in the IT sector.  For the 
main producers, the gains from IT-related productivity growth have been substantial, 
amounting to 6.7 percent annually for Singapore, 3.3 percent for Malaysia, and 2.1 percent 
for Ireland, and around 0.3 percent for the United States (consistent with earlier work), the 
United Kingdom, and Japan.   
However, as the prices of IT-related goods have fallen substantially, to the extent that 
these goods have been exported, there is a terms of trade loss that substantially erodes these 
gains, as is vividly illustrated in Table 4 and Figure 1.  The contribution of IT to domestic 
demand is much more equally distributed across countries than IT production.  As a 
                                                 
15 This formula is equivalent to that in Eq. (2), which is specified in terms of prices and 
quantities, rather than nominal expenditure.  See Whe lan (2000) for an extensive discussion 
of chain-weighted indices. 
16 Tables A1 and A2 provide further details on the level and composition of IT production 
and demand across countries. 
18 See appendix for data on the composition of IT production and absorption. 
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percentage of GDP, IT-related demand ranged from 2.4 percent (the United States) to 0.4 
percent of GDP (India) in 2000.  Excluding countries worst affected by the Asian crisis, IT-
related domestic demand has grown by 20 percent (Italy) to 36 percent (Taiwan) over the 
1996–2000 period.  As not only the level, but also the composition of IT-related spending 
differ less across countries than for production, the differences in price indices are less 
pronounced, and largely reflect changes in exchange rates.  Corresponding to the pattern of 
IT-related expenditure, the positive impact of productivity gains in the IT-sector on real 
domestic demand growth is much less concentrated than for IT production, and positively 
correlated with per-capita income.  The highest gains accrue to the United States, while 
Australia, which is not a significant producer of IT-related goods, is among the six countries 
realizing the highest gains.  Indeed, regressions indicate that gains to real GDP are not a 
significant determinant of benefits to domestic demand, although the results suggest that it 
may provide some gain once GDP per capita is taken into account (See Figure 1).17  In sum, 
while production of IT goods (when correctly measured) has provided significant output 
benefits to producers, the welfare-enhancing benefits to real domestic demand go largely to 
users. 
 
 
4.   Welfare Benefits of Falling Relative Prices of IT Goods 
 
We now turn to our second, and more direct, method of quantifying the welfare gains 
associated with productivity gains in the IT sector.18  The focus of this section is on the 
accumulated welfare benefits of the decline in prices of IT goods using the concept of “social 
                                                 
17 The coefficient on a regression of gains in terms of real domestic demand growth on gains 
in real GDP growth is small (0.02, with a t-ratio of 1.4) and becomes completely insignificant 
once Singapore, which is an outlier in terms of IT production, is excluded (0.01, with a t-ratio 
of 0.3).  When GDP per capita is included in the regression excluding Singapore, the 
coefficient of the gain in GDP growth rises (0.03, with a t-ratio of 1.4), while the coefficient 
of GDP per capita is 0.0014 (t-ratio:  3.4). 
18 This general approach has already been used to estimate the benefits from IT in the United 
States on macroeconomic and microeconomic data, e.g. by Brynjolfsson (1996) and Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson (1996). 
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saving,” which is a simple variation on consumer surplus used in the economic history 
literature on the welfare benefits of past waves of technological innovation. 19 
The gains in social saving owing to technological progress in the IT sector are 
represented by the area between the initial and the final price under the demand curve for 
products created by the new technology (see Figure 2).  Unlike the consumer surplus, social 
saving includes intermediate spending by other producers (for example, freight transportation 
for the railroads, provision of electrical power to factories, or computers for firms) as well as 
by consumers.  As the benefits from falling prices accrue to the purchasers of goods, not the 
producers, it is important to focus on the location of the buyers of the goods, rather than 
where they are produced.  This is particularly relevant for highly traded goods, whereas the 
distinction is much less important if the output industry embodying the general purpose 
technology is largely non-traded, as in the case of electricity generation or railway 
transportation.  A historical parallel of a technological revo lution whose products were highly 
traded is cotton textiles, where the relative price fell more than six-fold between 1770 and 
1841, and about half the British production was exported abroad (Harley, 1998).  As a result, 
Harley (1999) estimates that the welfare benefits to Britain to be about 12 percent of 1841 
income, with an approximately equal benefit (in value) to the rest of the world. 
If there is perfect competition in IT production, then all of the surplus from IT 
production is reflected in falling prices.  As the purchaser of an IT goods realizes one dollar 
in expected benefits as its price falls by one dollar, then the area under the demand curve 
provides an accurate measure of the benefits being provided by the IT sector.20 Indeed, if 
perfect competition is also present in the rest of the economy, then the benefits will 
eventually accrue to consumers.  In the calculations below, the benefits from purchases of IT 
equipment by firms are assumed to be realized in the country in which the IT equipment is 
bought.  If the gains from purchasing IT equipment are incorporated into final goods that are 
exported elsewhere, the welfare benefits will accrue in the other country.  However, while IT 
goods themselves are highly traded, the assumption that the benefits largely accrue 
                                                 
19 See Crafts (2000) for a comparison of this approach with the production function approach 
discussed above.  Fogel (1964) is the classic reference for the railroads.  In the historical 
literature, the social saving calculations generally do not account for the downward slope of 
the demand curve.  By contrast, the results reported below are derived from elasticities 
associated with an estimated demand curve. 
20 This assumes that the purchaser’s marginal benefits from additional spending are not 
affected by this change in the budget constraint.
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domestically appears reasonable given the relatively closed nature of many of the countries 
and regions being analyzed (such as the United States and Japan) and the importance of IT 
spending to service industries, where trade ratios tend to be low. 
The assumption that the IT industry is subject to perfect competition is sufficiently 
important to be worth discussing in more detail.  In a less competitive environment, the 
benefits of higher productivity could be captured by producers through higher profits (i.e. 
excess returns) or wages.  In terms of profits, some individual companies in the new 
technology sector have made high levels of profits.  However, such star performers are offset 
by lower profits of other companies whose innovations are less successful and by new 
entrants, just as in any other competitive industry.  Evidence from past large technological 
innovations indicates that no excess profits were made,21 and the highly competitive 
environment facing most IT companies makes it unlikely that such profits are being made 
currently, or at least that any such benefits are large in proportion to the fall in prices caused 
by competition. 22  Similar observations relate to wages, where, it should be noted, a 
significant part of compensation was paid in terms of share options, which do not involve a 
direct rise in current expenses. 
Among the many advantages of the social saving calculation is its simplicity.  As the 
supply of IT goods expands at a rapid rate, it is reasonable to assume that the path of real 
output and prices in the IT sector can be used to calculate the demand curve for such products 
(once account is taken of rises in demand due to networking benefits by using time 
dummies).  As is discussed later, this means that the demand curve can be identified using 
nominal spending on IT goods, their hedonic prices, and other series such as real GDP.  
Unlike the production function calculations discussed above, there is no need to make 
assumptions about such issues as depreciation rates of the IT capital stock, value added ratios, 
chain weighting, or the measurement of final output in industries such as financial services, 
which pose numerous methodological difficulties.  As long as individuals/firms make rational 
purchasing decisions, the eventual benefits of such purchases are measured by the difference 
between current prices and the demand curve — i.e. social saving.   
The analysis of changes in the social surplus offered here differs from the analysis of 
the impact of the IT sector on real domestic demand growth above in several aspects:  (1) 
                                                 
21 See Crafts (2000) and Brookes and Wahhaj (2000). 
22 International Monetary Fund (2001) contains more on the financial consequences of the IT 
revolution. 
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most directly, the social surplus – unlike changes in the rate of growth – represents the impact 
of falling prices of IT goods accumulated over a period of time; (2) in estimating the social 
surplus, we control for the effect of changes in GDP on the demand for IT goods; (3) as 
detailed below, we use the WITSA database for nominal spending on IT goods, covering a 
larger number of countries. 
 
4.1.   Empirical estimates 
 
The social saving calculation discussed above requires data on gross nominal spending on IT 
goods, price deflators, real GDP, and assumptions about the demand curve.  If the demand 
curve has constant elasticities, it can be written as: 
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where EIT is nominal per capita expenditure on IT goods, PIT is a price index for IT goods, 
PGDP is the GDP deflator, GDP stands for nominal GDP per capita, alpha is a constant term 
(made time varying in the calculations to take account of rising demand from networking 
benefits i.e. the effect that as more people have IT equipment the benefits increase), and b 
and g are the price and income elasticities of the demand for IT goods, respectively.  We are 
interested in the welfare gains from the fall in prices of IT-related goods over some specified 
period (say, between year 0 and year 1), evaluated at year 1.  For our specification, this 
means that we are conditioning on real GDP for year 1.  Using standard integration 
techniques, the increase in social saving between year 0 and year 1, owing to a fall in relative 
prices of IT goods, is: 
 ( )bb
g
bg
b
a
a --- -
-
×
=×=D ò 1 1,1 0,1
0,
1,
ITIT
t
p
p
t pp
RGDP
dssRGDPSS
IT
IT
, (5) 
The increase in social savings is larger for a higher level of real GDP (provided that 
the income elasticity g is positive), a larger decline in the relative price of IT goods, a higher 
price elasticity of demand (b), and, other things equal, larger demand for IT products 
(parameter a). 
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Data issues 
 
Separate calculations are reported below for IT hardware (comprising computers and 
peripheral equipment), software spending, and communication equipment.  The data on 
nominal spending on IT goods come from WITSA, a trade group associated with the IT 
industry which collects data across countries in a homogenous manner.  While the Reed 
database was used earlier because it includes data on both production and sales, the WITSA 
data (which does not include production) is preferable for this exercise due to its wider range 
of countries (around 50) and better data on sales.  In what follows, we use a sample of 41 
countries, which excludes from the full set of countries covered by WITSA nine transition 
economies whose data are likely to be contaminated by structural change.23 
Compared to using national account data across individual countries, the WITSA data 
have two advantages:  because they are homogenously collected they do not have the 
idiosyncrasies observed in IT data across national sources (such as significant differences in 
the ratio of gross spending to value added — see Deutsche Bank, 2001); and they focus on 
the theoretically correct concept of gross IT spending, rather than value added which is 
needed in the national account data to avoid double counting across the whole economy. 
The WITSA data cover the years 1992–99, dividing ICT spending into a range of 
components:  telecommunications, hardware, software, internal ICT spending, and ICT 
service spending.  For the purposes of social welfare calculations, it is necessary to map these 
data into spending on three types of goods for which there are hedonic price deflators, namely 
computers and peripheral equipment, software, and communications equipment.  Based on a 
comparison between the WITSA data and national account information on IT spending in 
both the United States and France, gross spending on computers and peripheral goods is 
assumed to equal the WITSA data on hardware spending, while spending on communications 
equipment is assumed to comprise 30 percent of overall telecommunications equipment 
(these assumptions are also made in Schreyer, 2000).  For software, gross spending is 
                                                 
23 The group comprises 18 countries that include the largest 12 producers and consumers —
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (used later as a check on the estimation results) plus 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Chile, China (PRC), Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, 
Greece, Hong Kong (SAR), India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
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assumed to be double the WITSA series on such spending, as spending on in-house software 
programming (which is included in the national accounts data from which the hedonic price 
indices are derived) is likely to be included in WITSA’s internal ICT spending.  As discussed 
in Section 3, the (hedonic) price indices for IT goods across countries are calculated based on 
those used in the US NIPA, adjusted by exchange rate changes. 
The relevant income and price elasticities were estimated using a panel regression 
from  1992 to 1999 with fixed time dummies and country effects, with the following 
specification: 
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where i indexes countries, t indicated time periods, and the respective variables are 
defined as for Eq. 4, above.  Time dummies were used to account for autonomous changes in 
demand associated with network benefits associated with diffusion of users and information 
on the capabilities of the new technology.  The specification uses OLS, which is appropriate 
if the changes in underlying price changes are being driven entirely by supply-side changes.  
This seems a reasonable approximation given the rapid changes in technology and 
competitive nature of the sector.  Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996) find that using more 
sophisticated econometric techniques makes little difference for IT calculations of this type. 
The results are reported in Table 5, and indicate price elasticities of between -0.9 (for 
telecommunications equipment) and -1.3 (for hardware), estimates that are similar to those 
generated by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995).  The income elasticities, estimated between 1.2 
and 1.8, are generally significantly larger than one, indicating that IT products are superior 
goods.24  
Given the importance of these coefficients for the calculations, the elasticities were 
reestimated using two other samples, first a group of 18 countries, which includes the 12 
largest consumers and the 12 largest producers of IT goods, where the data may be assumed 
to be the most reliable, and second official NIA data for two countries where such 
information is readily available, namely the United States and France (Tables 6 and 7).  The 
results for the group of 18 countries tend to find somewhat sma ller (absolute) values of the 
price and income elasticities, although in the coefficient that matters most in the calculations 
                                                 
24 Hitt and Brinjolfsson (1996) find elasticities of around 1 for a cross-sectional regression 
across US industries. 
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— the absolute value of the price elasticity of hardware — the differences are relatively small 
(1.13 versus 1.31).  The opposite tendency is true of the regressions on individual country 
data — absolute values of the elasticities tend to be larger.  This is particularly true of the 
income elasticities, reflecting the absence of time dummies that model autonomous rises in 
demand for IT equipment.  In the case of the most critical parameter — the absolute value of 
the price elasticity for hardware — the elasticities are higher, ranging from 1.49-1.79.  In 
short, these calculations find a range of values for this critical elasticity of 1.1-1.8, with the 
calculation based on the full panel of 41 countries producing a “reasonable” value of 1.3.  
Accordingly, this is the value used in the calculations.25 
The welfare gains over 1992–99 for all 41 countries are reported in Tables 8 and 9, 
with the benefits being calculated based on the fitted level of expenditure on hardware, 
software, and communications equipment for 1999, and the fall in relative prices of the 
respective category of IT expenditure over 1992–99.  The change in relative prices reported 
in Table 8 is based on a weighted geometric average of the respective price indices.  Table 8 
also provides an estimate of the gain in social saving for the period 1985–2001.  While the 
WITSA dataset (on which the estimated demand curves are based) extends from 1992–99, 
Equation 5 can be used to obtain estimates of the change in social saving for longer periods, 
provided that the change in relative prices of IT goods is known.   
The following results stand out: 
Benefits are loosely associated with income per capita.  As countries near the 
technological barrier are the most likely to be in the vanguard in adopting IT, current social 
saving benefits would be expected to be related to income per capita.  As Figure 3 shows, this 
relationship is broadly true, but there is also a lot of individual country variance.   
The social saving benefits are not closely connected to the size of IT production in a 
country.  Some of the major beneficiaries have small domestic IT sectors (such as Australia 
                                                 
25 Using a price elasticity of 1.1 (or 1.8) for IT hardware in the US, rather than an elasticity of 
1.3, we obtain estimates of the social surplus (hardware only) that are 17 percent  lower (or 63 
percent higher), with a similar effect for other countries in the sample.  As a further 
sensitivity check, we have also calculated the social surplus using a Hicksian demand 
function.  The results are very similar to the ones presented here; for IT hardware, estimates 
of the social surplus based on a Hicksian compensated demand function are about 1-2 percent 
(not percentage points) higher across countries. 
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and New Zealand), while other countries which are major producers of IT equipment are not 
experiencing major social saving gains (such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines).26 
While the largest social gains are in the United States, several other countries also 
have significant benefits.  The social saving gains in the United States are estimated at around 
4 percent of GDP over the 1992–99 period, rising to 5.6 percent of GDP for 1985–2001.  
However, a range of other countries — Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom — have social saving gains that are over 80 percent the size, in terms of GDP, of 
those accruing to the United States during 1992–99. 
Social saving gains in many euro-area members are currently relatively small.  The 
social saving benefits are only about 50 percent of the United States value, in terms of GDP, 
for Germany, Austria, and France, and about a third for Italy and Greece, compared with 70 
percent or more for other Europeans countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Finland, and the United Kingdom. 
The main component of gains in social saving is expenditure on hardware.  As Table 
9 shows, about 60 percent of the gains from IT investment, on average, come from hardware, 
largely reflecting larger decreases in relative prices.   
For countries with lower overall IT expenditure, the share of telecommunications in 
overall IT expenditure tends to be higher.  However, owing to a smaller decline in relative 
prices for telecommunications equipment (compared with computer hardware), their 
contribution to the overall social surplus is relatively smaller. 
The estimated benefits for the United States and several other countries since 1985 
(and even 1992) are already significant compared to the overall benefits for the leading 
countries of some earlier “all-purpose” technological revolutions, such as the railways or 
electricity.  For example, the overall benefits of the railways are estimated to have been at 
about 10 percent of GDP for England and Wales and 5–10 percent for the United States.  This 
reflects the more rapid accrual of benefits in the IT revolution compared with earlier 
technological revolutions (Crafts, 2001).   
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Similar to the results found in Section 3. 
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5.   Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes the macroeconomic impact of falling prices of IT goods on welfare from 
two different angles.  First, following an approach similar to earlier growth-accounting 
studies, but expanding the work to look at both real GDP and real domestic demand, we find 
that while IT sectors have provided substantial output benefits to those countries with large 
production sectors, most of the demand-side benefits have been transferred to importing 
countries through changes in the terms of trade.  For example, some of the major producers of 
IT goods (Malaysia, Ireland) experience only average gains in terms of the growth rate of real 
domestic demand, while Australia, with little production of IT-related goods, is among the 
principal gainers. 
Second, we estimate the social savings associated with falling prices of IT goods.  
Social saving, a generalization of consumer surplus, has been used in the economic history 
literature to estimate the welfare benefits of earlier waves of technological innovation.  We 
again find that the benefits of IT use are not closely correlated with the size of the IT-
producing sector in an economy.  Our results also indicate that the gains in social saving are 
substantial.  For the period 1985–2001, the fall in the prices of IT goods is associated with 
social savings of 5 percent of GDP or more for the United States, Singapore, New Zealand, 
and Australia.  This means that social saving gains associated with IT already are a 
significant proportion of the gains from some earlier general-purpose technological 
revolutions such as railways. 
The observation that the main benefits of IT accrue to users rather than producers is 
important for at least two reasons.  First, it suggest that while earlier work focusing on the 
benefits of IT in terms of output is useful in assessing the size of gains associated with the IT 
revolution, it tells only part of the story and fails to illustrate how the benefits of this 
production are distributed across countries (the focus of this study) or within a country 
(where the IT sector reaps little benefit from technological innovation, again owing to falling 
relative prices).  Second, while this study is limited to an analysis of the direct benefits of 
falling relative prices, the productivity spillovers to the rest of the economy as production 
techniques are reorganized also depend upon use, not production, further underlining our 
central message. 
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Table 1.  Changes in Relative Prices of IT Goods for the United States (Accumulated 
change over the period indicated, in percent) 
 1985–92 1992–2001 1985–2001 
Computers and peripheral equipment -64.4 -87.9 -95.7 
Software -26.7 -20.1 -41.1 
Communication equipment -18.9 -32.9 -45.6 
Digital integrated circuits -48.6 -77.6 -88.5 
Microprocessors -33.1 -99.3 -99.6 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and 
Product Account Tables, and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Indices (for integrated circuits 
and microprocessors). 
 
 
Table 2.  Contribution of IT to Acceleration in Productivity Growth in the United States 
 
Gordon, 2002 
U.S. 
CEA, 2001 
Jorgenson and 
Stiroh, 2000 
Oliner and 
Sichel, 2000 
Period under study 1995–2000 1995–2000 1995–1999 1995–1999 
     
Acceleration 1.44 1.63 0.95 1.16 
Capital deepening     
IT -related 0.60 0.62 0.34 0.50 
Other -0.23 -0.23 -0.05 -0.17 
Labor Quality 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 
TFP      
IT -related 0.30 0.18 0.24 0.31 
Other 0.22 1.00 0.41 0.49 
Contribution of Price Measurement 0.14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Cyclical Effect  0.40 0.04 n.a. n.a. 
  Sources:  See References. 
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Table 3.  The Impact of the IT Sector on Real GDP Growth, 1996–2000 
  
IT 
production 
(share of 
GDP, 
2000) 
Relative 
price of IT 
products 
(annual 
rate of 
growth) 
 
 
IT 
production 
(annual rate 
of growth) 
Impact of IT 
productivity 
gains 
(contribution 
to GDP 
growth) 
Australia 0.2 -9.0 2.0 0.03 
Austria 0.6 -5.7 13.5 0.03 
Belgium 1.4 -7.7 12.8 0.10 
Brazil 1.1 -14.5 23.1 0.17 
Canada 0.8 -12.5 17.8 0.10 
Denmark 0.5 3.6 21.6 -0.01 
Finland 5.3 2.5 19.8 -0.09 
France 1.5 -4.9 14.0 0.06 
Germany 1.1 -4.6 16.3 0.04 
Greece 0.3 -4.7 16.5 0.01 
Hong Kong (SAR) 1.1 -15.8 18.5 0.20 
India 0.2 -11.0 9.4 0.04 
Indonesia 2.0 -8.5 45.0 0.17 
Ireland 14.2 -18.1 48.1 2.10 
Israel 3.2 -10.1 30.7 0.27 
Italy 0.8 -10.8 13.0 0.09 
Japan 2.6 -12.8 17.4 0.37 
Korea 9.7 -10.4 32.4 0.85 
Malaysia 31.5 -15.0 47.8 3.31 
Netherlands 1.0 -12.2 13.6 0.13 
Norway 0.4 -5.9 5.8 0.03 
Philippines 11.7 -15.4 54.7 1.13 
Portugal 0.5 -13.8 16.5 0.07 
Singapore 39.2 -17.6 34.4 6.71 
South Africa 0.3 6.4 -3.8 -0.01 
Spain 0.7 -5.0 13.9 0.03 
Sweden 4.3 2.7 20.1 -0.10 
Switzerland 0.5 -5.2 6.8 0.03 
Taiwan Province of China 8.9 -19.2 44.9 1.50 
Thailand 8.2 -15.3 42.4 0.96 
United Kingdom 2.0 -16.2 28.1 0.30 
United States 1.8 -15.1 27.5 0.28 
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Table 4.  The Impact of the IT Sector on the Growth Rate of Real Domestic Demand, 
1996–2000 
  
IT 
expenditure 
(share of 
GDP, 2000) 
 
 
IT expenditure 
(real annual 
rate of growth) 
 
Price index for 
IT expenditure 
(annual rate of 
growth) 
Impact of IT 
productivity gains 
(contribution to 
change in demand 
growth) 
Australia 1.8 29.4 -15.6 0.25 
Austria 1.8 26.9 -9.7 0.12 
Belgium 2.0 21.2 -8.2 0.13 
Brazil 1.2 31.6 -11.2 0.10 
Canada 1.6 32.5 -17.8 0.28 
Denmark  1.8 26.7 -13.3 0.21 
Finland 1.6 26.7 -12.8 0.21 
France  1.7 19.1 -7.7 0.11 
Germany 1.6 23.6 -10.3 0.12 
Greece  1.3 19.9 -6.0 0.05 
Hong Kong (SAR) 1.3 20.8 -15.3 0.20 
India 0.4 24.9 -16.7 0.08 
Indonesia 0.8 1.6 -2.7 0.01 
Ireland 1.4 27.9 -12.9 0.20 
Israel 1.3 25.2 -16.5 0.21 
Italy 1.3 19.8 -10.1 0.11 
Japan 1.2 20.4 -13.6 0.17 
Korea 3.0 22.0 -9.2 0.28 
Malaysia 1.4 16.4 -10.7 0.21 
Netherlands  1.9 26.2 -11.3 0.19 
Norway 1.6 23.5 -12.9 0.22 
Philippines 1.3 15.7 -7.9 0.09 
Portugal 1.3 20.6 -10.7 0.11 
Singapore 2.7 24.6 -10.3 0.30 
South Africa 2.4 26.8 -9.8 0.19 
Spain 1.7 28.3 -8.0 0.09 
Sweden 2.4 20.9 -12.6 0.31 
Switzerland 2.1 24.2 -10.2 0.18 
Taiwan Province of China 1.0 35.6 -15.4 0.15 
Thailand 1.0 15.2 -9.9 0.10 
United Kingdom 2.1 28.3 -16.3 0.31 
United States 2.4 31.5 -16.7 0.39 
  Source:  Author’s calculation. 
 
 - 22 -
 
Table 5.  Estimated Demand Elasticities for the Sample 
Including 41 Countries 
 Price 
elasticity 
Income 
elasticity 
 
R2 
Hardware 1.31 
(15.7) 
1.58 
(10.1) 
0.995 
Software 1.05 
(9.8) 
1.84 
(9.1) 
0.994 
Telecommunications equipment 0.87 
(7.8) 
1.21 
(5.7) 
0.987 
  Notes:  t-ratios in parentheses. 
 
Table 6.  Estimated Demand Elasticities for the Sample Including 18 Countries 
 Price 
elasticity 
Income 
elasticity R
2 
Hardware 1.13 (9.0) 
1.53 
(7.1) 0.993 
Software 0.71 (4.6) 
1.62 
(6.2) 0.991 
Telecommunications equipment 0.58 (3.6) 
0.68 
(2.43) 0.981 
  Notes: t-ratios in parentheses. 
 
Table 7.  Estimated Elasticities for the United States and France, 
 1980–99 
 Price 
Elasticity 
Income 
elasticity 
 
R2 
United States    
  Hardware 1.79 
(9.5) 
3.23 
(10.3) 
1.00 
  Software 1.52 
(3.8) 
2.40 
(5.2) 
1.00 
  Telecommunications equipment 2.75 
(6.3) 
4.1 
(8.2) 
1.00 
France    
  Hardware 1.49 
(7.9) 
2.75 
(9.4) 
1.00 
  Software 0.6 
(2.1) 
1.44 
(4.5) 
1.00 
  Telecommunications equipment 3.3 
(14.3) 
4.6 
(17.9) 
1.00 
  Notes:  t-ratios in parentheses.  A time trend was included in the regressions. 
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Table 8.  ITC Expenditure and Social Saving 
Expenditure on ITC 
goods, 1999 
(In percent of GDP) 
 
actual fitted 
Change in relative 
price of ITC goods, 
1992–99 
(In percent) 
Change in Social 
Saving, 1992–99 
(In percent of GDP) 
Change in Social 
Saving, 1985–2001 
(In percent of GDP) 
Argentina 1.6 1.7 -46.0 1.3 1.3 
Australia 4.1 4.3 -48.7 3.6 5.0 
Austria 2.6 2.7 -49.0 2.0 2.7 
Belgium 3.4 3.2 -45.2 2.3 3.0 
Brazil 3.4 2.1 -53.2 1.8 2.1 
Canada 3.9 3.7 -46.1 2.8 4.0 
Chile 2.7 2.5 -53.5 2.2 2.7 
China (PRC) 2.2 2.1 -63.2 2.0 2.4 
Colombia 3.5 2.2 -62.5 2.1 2.3 
Denmark  3.5 3.5 -53.6 2.9 4.0 
Egypt 1.0 1.3 -68.5 1.1 1.0 
Finland 3.3 3.3 -52.0 2.7 3.8 
France  2.7 2.8 -47.7 2.1 2.7 
Germany 3.0 2.8 -48.0 2.1 2.8 
Greece  1.8 1.7 -49.8 1.3 1.3 
Hong Kong (SAR) 3.1 3.1 -59.5 3.0 3.6 
India 1.3 1.4 -52.3 1.1 1.1 
Indonesia 0.9 1.3 -45.1 1.0 0.9 
Ireland 2.5 3.1 -55.4 2.7 3.6 
Israel 3.5 3.6 -55.8 3.2 4.2 
Italy 2.0 2.2 -40.1 1.5 1.9 
Japan 2.8 2.9 -58.6 2.6 3.4 
Korea 2.8 3.4 -56.6 3.2 4.4 
Malaysia 3.1 3.1 -46.3 2.5 3.4 
Mexico 1.4 1.9 -56.4 1.6 1.8 
Netherlands  3.9 3.7 -49.2 2.8 3.9 
New Zealand 4.8 4.5 -51.0 3.9 5.1 
Norway 3.1 3.4 -52.8 2.7 3.8 
Philippines 1.5 1.8 -59.1 1.5 1.7 
Portugal 2.3 2.2 -52.5 1.8 2.1 
Singapore 4.4 4.4 -54.3 4.0 5.4 
South Africa 3.9 3.3 -47.8 2.6 3.7 
Spain 1.9 2.2 -39.8 1.6 2.0 
Sweden 4.0 4.1 -44.6 3.2 4.7 
Switzerland 4.3 3.9 -50.1 3.1 4.2 
Taiwan Province of China 2.4 2.3 -47.2 1.9 2.4 
Thailand 1.5 1.8 -50.0 1.4 1.6 
Turkey 2.0 1.6 -49.1 1.3 1.4 
United Kingdom 3.6 4.1 -54.9 3.5 4.8 
United States 4.2 4.5 -58.3 4.1 5.6 
Venezuela 1.7 2.0 -72.4 2.0 2.3 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9.  Decomposition of Social Saving 
 
Hardware 
 
Software 
Communications 
Equipment 
 
(In percent 
of GDP) 
(In percent 
of total) 
(In percent 
of GDP) 
(In percent 
of total) 
(In percent 
of GDP) 
(In percent 
of total) 
Change in Social 
Saving, 1992–99 
(In percent of GDP) 
Argentina 0.4 29.7 0.0 0.8 0.9 69.6 1.3 
Australia 2.3 62.5 0.0 0.8 1.3 36.8 3.6 
Austria 1.2 58.6 0.0 1.1 0.8 40.3 2.0 
Belgium 1.3 59.2 0.0 1.7 0.9 39.0 2.3 
Brazil 0.9 48.7 0.0 2.5 0.9 48.8 1.8 
Canada 1.9 66.2 0.0 -1.1 1.0 35.0 2.8 
Chile 1.1 48.8 0.0 1.9 1.1 49.3 2.2 
China (PRC) 1.1 57.1 0.0 0.5 0.8 42.5 2.0 
Colombia 1.0 47.2 0.1 3.1 1.0 49.8 2.1 
Denmark  1.9 67.2 0.1 1.9 0.9 31.0 2.9 
Egypt 0.4 34.1 0.0 4.6 0.6 61.3 1.1 
Finland 1.8 67.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 32.7 2.7 
France  1.2 56.9 0.0 0.7 0.9 42.3 2.1 
Germany 1.2 57.0 0.0 1.1 0.9 41.9 2.1 
Greece  0.3 26.0 0.0 1.8 1.0 72.2 1.3 
Hong Kong (SAR) 1.5 49.4 0.1 2.2 1.5 48.3 3.0 
India 0.4 35.6 0.0 0.6 0.7 63.8 1.1 
Indonesia 0.3 29.1 0.0 -0.6 0.7 71.5 1.0 
Ireland 1.6 57.3 0.0 1.7 1.1 41.0 2.7 
Israel 1.9 60.6 0.1 4.5 1.1 34.9 3.2 
Italy 0.7 45.1 0.0 -1.9 0.9 56.7 1.5 
Japan 1.6 60.4 0.1 2.1 1.0 37.5 2.6 
Korea 2.1 65.9 0.0 -0.2 1.1 34.3 3.2 
Malaysia 1.5 57.4 0.0 -0.8 1.1 43.4 2.5 
Mexico 0.7 42.9 0.0 1.6 0.9 55.5 1.6 
Netherlands  1.8 64.0 0.0 1.6 1.0 34.4 2.8 
New Zealand 2.3 59.0 0.2 4.1 1.4 36.9 3.9 
Norway 1.8 66.3 0.0 0.8 0.9 32.9 2.7 
Philippines 0.7 48.4 0.0 2.1 0.7 49.5 1.5 
Portugal 0.8 45.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 53.7 1.8 
Singapore 2.6 64.8 0.1 1.7 1.3 33.5 4.0 
South Africa 1.7 64.1 0.0 -1.9 1.0 37.8 2.6 
Spain 0.8 47.6 0.0 -2.2 0.9 54.7 1.6 
Sweden 2.3 71.0 -0.1 -3.1 1.0 32.1 3.2 
Switzerland 2.0 63.3 0.1 2.4 1.1 34.3 3.1 
Taiwan Province of China 0.9 47.3 0.0 -0.3 1.0 53.0 1.9 
Thailand 0.6 47.2 0.0 -0.4 0.7 53.2 1.4 
Turkey 0.5 36.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 63.8 1.3 
United Kingdom 2.4 67.3 0.2 4.8 1.0 27.9 3.5 
United States 2.8 69.7 0.2 5.3 1.0 25.1 4.1 
Venezuela 1.0 52.1 0.1 5.3 0.9 42.6 2.0 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1. The Impact of the IT Sector on the Growth of Real GDP and 
Domestic Demand (In Percent)
Singapore
United States
United Kingdom
MalaysiaAustralia
 
 
 
Social Saving 
0 P 
1 P 
0 0 P E 1 1 P E 
Price 
Demand 
Figure 2. The Demand for IT Goods 
and the Social Saving 
 
 
 - 26 -
 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000
Figure 3. The Increase in Social Surplus, 1985- 2001,
and GDP Per Capita
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 S
oc
ia
l S
ur
pl
us
 (i
n 
pe
rc
en
t)
GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)
 
 
Appendix 
 - 27-
Table A1.  IT Production, 1996–2000 
(avg.  share of GDP, 1996–2000) 
 
EDP goods Communications 
Equipment 
Active Components 
(net exports)  
Sum 
Australia 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2 
Austria 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5 
Belgium 0.8 0.6 -0.2 1.2 
Brazil 1.1 0.2 -0.2 1.1 
Canada 0.6 0.5 -0.4 0.7 
Denmark  0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.3 
Finland 0.7 4.0 -0.8 3.8 
France  0.5 0.8 -0.1 1.3 
Germany 0.4 0.6 -0.1 0.9 
Greece  0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.3 
Hong Kong (SAR) 1.1 0.5 -0.5 1.1 
India 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.3 
Indonesia 0.8 0.6 0.1 1.5 
Ireland 10.0 1.9 -0.4 11.5 
Israel 1.0 2.0 -0.3 2.7 
Italy 0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.8 
Japan 1.4 0.9 0.4 2.7 
Korea 2.0 2.0 3.6 7.6 
Malaysia 12.9 1.9 6.4 21.3 
Netherlands  0.9 0.3 -0.2 1.0 
Norway 0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.4 
Philippines 2.3 0.4 5.3 7.9 
Portugal 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.5 
Singapore 27.0 0.5 6.8 34.4 
South Africa 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.2 
Spain 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.6 
Sweden 0.1 3.5 -0.4 3.1 
Switzerland 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.5 
Taiwan Province of China 7.5 0.6 -0.7 7.4 
Thailand 5.8 0.5 0.0 6.2 
United Kingdom 1.1 0.8 -0.2 1.8 
United States 1.0 0.8 -0.1 1.7 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on Reed.  See Section 3 for definitions of the respective categories 
of IT goods. 
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Table A2.  IT Expenditure, 1996–2000 (Reed) 
(Avg.  share of GDP, 1996–2000)  
 
EDP goods Communications 
Equipment 
Sum 
Australia 1.2 0.3 1.5 
Austria 0.8 0.5 1.3 
Belgium 0.9 0.7 1.6 
Brazil 0.7 0.3 1.0 
Canada 1.1 0.3 1.4 
Denmark  1.1 0.4 1.5 
Finland 1.1 0.3 1.4 
France  0.7 0.7 1.4 
Germany 0.8 0.4 1.2 
Greece  0.4 0.7 1.0 
Hong Kong (SAR) 0.7 0.5 1.2 
India 0.3 0.1 0.4 
Indonesia 0.3 0.7 0.9 
Ireland 0.8 0.5 1.3 
Israel 0.9 0.4 1.3 
Italy 0.5 0.6 1.1 
Japan 0.8 0.4 1.2 
Korea 1.1 1.5 2.6 
Malaysia 0.9 0.6 1.5 
Netherlands  1.1 0.5 1.6 
Norway 1.0 0.5 1.5 
Philippines 0.5 0.7 1.2 
Portugal 0.6 0.4 1.1 
Singapore 1.3 1.1 2.4 
South Africa 1.2 0.7 1.9 
Spain 0.5 0.7 1.3 
Sweden 1.4 0.8 2.2 
Switzerland 1.2 0.6 1.7 
Taiwan Province of China 0.6 0.2 0.9 
Thailand 0.5 0.4 0.9 
United Kingdom 1.1 0.7 1.8 
United States 1.4 0.9 2.2 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on Reed.  See Section 3 for definitions of 
the respective categories of IT goods. 
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Table A3.  Relative Prices of IT Goods, 1996–2000 
(Avg.  annual rate of change, 1996–2000) 
 
EDP goods Communications 
Equipment 
Active 
Components  
Software 
Australia -19.5 0.4 -14.7 2.4 
Austria -16.7 3.9 -11.7 6.0 
Belgium -16.8 3.8 -11.8 5.9 
Brazil -17.5 3.0 -12.5 5.1 
Canada -22.0 -2.7 -17.3 -0.7 
Denmark  -18.3 1.9 -13.4 3.9 
Finland -17.2 3.3 -12.2 5.4 
France  -17.1 3.4 -12.1 5.5 
Germany -16.4 4.4 -11.4 6.5 
Greece  -19.0 1.1 -14.1 3.0 
Hong Kong (SAR) -22.0 -2.6 -17.3 -0.7 
India -22.3 -3.0 -17.6 -1.1 
Indonesia -17.1 3.4 -12.2 5.5 
Ireland -20.5 -0.9 -15.8 1.1 
Israel -22.8 -3.6 -18.1 -1.7 
Italy -20.3 -0.6 -15.6 1.4 
Japan -19.4 0.6 -14.6 2.6 
Korea -17.3 3.2 -12.3 5.3 
Malaysia -18.6 1.6 -13.7 3.7 
Netherlands  -17.3 3.2 -12.4 5.2 
Norway -21.2 -1.6 -16.4 0.3 
Philippines -19.6 0.3 -14.8 2.3 
Portugal -19.1 0.9 -14.3 2.9 
Singapore -18.8 1.3 -14.0 3.3 
South Africa -17.2 3.3 -12.2 5.4 
Spain -18.5 1.7 -13.6 3.7 
Sweden -19.0 1.0 -14.2 3.0 
Switzerland -16.8 3.8 -11.8 5.9 
Taiwan Province of China -20.2 -0.4 -15.4 1.6 
Thailand -16.7 3.9 -11.7 6.0 
United Kingdom -23.5 -4.6 -18.9 -2.6 
United States -23.4 -4.5 -18.8 -2.5 
  Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on US National Income and Product Accounts and US 
Producer Price Indices. 
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